What Jensen and Meckling Really Said About the Public Company by Cheffins, Brian




Brian R. Cheffins* 
 
Abstract 
Accepted views of a classic academic work can quite readily distort the original text.  
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s widely cited 1976 article “Theory of the Firm:  
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” exemplifies the pattern.  The 
article has been cited as a key inspiration for various significant governance changes 
affecting publicly traded firms, including moving the maximization of shareholder value to 
the top of the managerial priority list.  Jensen and Meckling in fact had little to say about 
altering the corporate landscape, in substantial measure because they were favorably disposed 
toward the public company.  This chapter canvasses the wide gap between what Jensen and 
Meckling supposedly said about the public company and what they actually said and explains 
how this discrepancy occurred.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s “Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”1 likely is the most widely cited academic article that 
engages with corporate personhood and corporate purpose.  Accepted views of classic works 
in an academic discipline often exaggerate or distort the original text.2  As this chapter will 
discuss, Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 Journal of Financial Economics is an exemplary 
example.   
The public company is terrain where the disconnect between what Jensen and 
Meckling supposedly said and actually said is particularly pronounced.  This, moreover, has 
not been a case of “no harm, no foul.”3  Instead, the mistranslation of what Jensen and 
Meckling said has meant “Theory of the Firm” has been blamed incorrectly for fostering key 
governance changes many believe have gone awry.  For instance, various critics of a late 20th 
century prioritization of shareholder value maintain Jensen and Meckling provided pivotal 
intellectual cover for this trend.  Instead, Jensen and Meckling, having characterized the firm 
as a nexus of contracting relations in their famous 1976 article, suggested that it was 
misconceived to seek to attribute a corporate purpose to such a nexus.   
Jensen and Meckling similarly stand accused of recommending for the public 
company governance cures many believe ended up being worse than the disease.  For 
instance, they reputedly were influential intellectual cheerleaders for hostile takeovers in 
                                                          
1  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).   
2  Mark S. Mizruchi & Lisa C. Fein, The Social Construction of Organizational 
Knowledge: A Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism, 44 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 653 (1999); Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirschman, The Modern 
Corporation as Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2010).   
3  It cannot be taken for granted that selective treatment of classic works will be a source 
of concern -- Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 2, 680. 
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advance of a 1980s takeover boom that “transformed the economic landscape…with what to 
many seemed like great brutality and waste.”4  Also, Jensen and Meckling ostensibly helped 
to swing public companies around to the idea of incentivizing executive compensation, a 
trend that would in the 1990s become so lucrative for senior management that Jensen said in 
2002 “I'm now a critic of where we got to.”5  In fact, Jensen and Meckling were public 
company optimists in “Theory of the Firm” who had little to say about changing the 
corporate landscape, including with respect to takeovers and the overhauling of managerial 
compensation.   
This chapter canvasses the wide gap between what Jensen and Meckling supposedly 
said about the public company and what they actually said and explains how this discrepancy 
occurred.  Part II of the chapter draws attention to the fame that Jensen and Meckling’s 
“Theory of the Firm” has enjoyed in academic circles, emphasizing in so doing the article’s 
reputation as a catalyst for change in the public company realm.  Part III describes the 
exaggerations and distortions that have arisen in relation to the article.  Part IV accounts for 
the substantial disconnect between what Jensen and Meckling supposedly and actually said, 
focusing particularly on a dramatic 1980s shift by Jensen from public company optimist to 
public company pessimist.  Part V concludes.   
II. JENSEN AND MECKLING’S LONG SHADOW  
Evidence abounds of the academic notoriety of Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of the 
Firm.”  It is currently one of the most-referenced papers in the fields of economics, finance, 
accounting and corporate governance and may well be the most cited article ever about 
                                                          
4  JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET:  A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, 
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 168 (2011). 
5  John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle, NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, 64, 75.     
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business.6  According to Google Scholar, ”Theory of the Firm” has been cited nearly 90,000 
times -- more than three times as often as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ classic 1932 
study of corporate America, The Modern Corporation & Private Property.7  Moreover, 
Jensen and Meckling’s article is hardly destined for intellectual obscurity.  Again according 
to Google, “Theory of the Firm” was cited nearly 6000 times in 2019 alone.   
“Theory of the Firm” is best known for its contribution to agency theory, which has 
had a profound intellectual impact in the realms of economics, corporate governance, 
corporate law and organizational behavior.8  Jensen and Meckling defined “an agency 
relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent.” 9  Jensen and Meckling acknowledged agents would 
not always make choices that maximized the welfare of their principals.  Principals and 
agents would take steps, however, to reduce this “residual loss,” meaning agency costs were 
“the sum of:  (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures 
by the agent, (3) the residual loss.”10 
                                                          
6  David Gindis, On the Origins, Meaning and Influence of Jensen and Meckling’s 
Definition of the Firm, unpublished working paper, 1 (2020) (forthcoming OXF. ECON. 
PAPERS); A New Idolatry, ECONOMIST, April 24, 2010, 65.  
7  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932).  This pattern has prevailed since the 1980s – Jason Scott Johnston, The 
Influence of the Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 230-
31 (1993).   
8  RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 318 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to 
Corporate Governance in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
3, 4 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).  
9  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 308.  
10  Id. 
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Jensen and Meckling were not the originators of agency theory.11  For instance, in a 
1973 article offering a theoretical analysis of agent pay-off structures economist Stephen 
Ross noted “(e)xamples of agency are universal”.12  Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling, by 
putting agency costs at the centre of their 56-page analysis of the ownership structure of 
firms,13 provided a wide-ranging research agenda that would jump start agency theory.14  
Jensen and Meckling’s framework would in time serve as a departure point for analysis in 
dozens if not hundreds of papers by economists, legal academics and business scholars.15  
Jensen, who wrote additional influential articles about agency costs in the 1980s,16 would 
become “the eminence grise of agency theory.”17 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article also achieved fame due to their characterization of 
the firm as “a nexus for contracting relationships.”18  While incorporated entities are vested 
formally with legal personality,19 Jensen and Meckling treated the corporate form as “a mere 
                                                          
11  Barry M. Mitnick, Origin of the Theory of Agency:  An Account by One of the 
Theory’s Originators, unpublished working paper, 7 (2019).   
12  Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 
AMER. ECON. REV. 134, 134 (1973).   
13  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 305-6, 308.   
14  Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL. L. REV. 909, 913 (2013); J.B. Heaton, Corporate Governance and the Cult of Agency, 
64 VILL. L. REV. 201, 210 (2019).  
15  Gelter, supra note 14, 913; Margaret M. Blair, Institutionalists, Neoclassicals and 
Team Production, 43 BRIT. J. INDUST. REL. 605, 606 (2005).   
16  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
17  Simon London, Why Cash has Become King Once Again, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, 
12.  See also Thomas Clarke, The Long Road to Reformulating the Understanding of 
Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 452  
(2015) (“arch-priest of agency theory”).   
18  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 310-11.    
19  ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 15, 17 (1986).   
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legal fiction”20 of minimal analytical significance.  They said crucial questions, such as “why 
particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the 
consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes 
exogenous to the organization” should be addressed with “the essential contractual nature of 
firms” as the departure point.21   
Some credit Jensen and Meckling with describing the corporation as a “nexus of 
contracts.”22  In fact fellow economist Eugene Fama coined the term in 1980.23  Nevertheless, 
Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of the Firm” would have a profound impact on the manner in 
which corporate law academics conceptualized the corporation.  The article provided the 
intellectual foundation for the development of an economically-oriented “contractarian” 
model of the corporation that fostered intense debate in the 1980s before moving to the 
theoretical forefront in the 1990s, at least in the United States.24  The nexus-of-contracts 
conception of the corporation has continued to loom large in corporate law scholarship in the 
                                                          
20  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 311. 
21  Id. 
22  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1549, 1549, n. 1 (1989); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a 
Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1999). 
23  Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 
290 (1980); MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 72, 
n. 50 (2013).   
24  Eisenberg, supra note 22, 819 (highlighting Jensen and Meckling’s role as originators 
of the nexus of contracts model and identifying critics); William W. Bratton, Economic 
Structure of the Post--Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 184, n. 25 (1992) 
(identifying critics); Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 484 (2004) (describing the dominance of the nexus of contracts model 
by the end of the 1990s). 
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years since.25  Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article correspondingly is “one of the most 
canonic and influential articles in the field of theory of the firm.”26 
Jensen and Meckling’s agency cost and contracting nexus insights could be relevant 
for a firm regardless of its size or ownership structure.  Jensen and Meckling indeed 
commenced their theoretical analysis of firms assuming that they were dealing with a firm of 
a fixed size with an owner-manager who owned all of the equity and derived insights by 
relaxing these assumptions.27  Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling’s analysis resonated 
particularly for the publicly traded firm with widely dispersed share ownership.28  They 
observed “it should be no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the ‘separation 
of ownership and control’ in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately 
associated with the general problem of agency.”29  Jensen and Meckling specifically 
acknowledged that Berle and Means had “popularized” in the early 1930s the potential for 
manager/shareholder misalignment when large American firms were publicly traded and 
characterized by a separation of ownership and control.30  Jensen subsequently said of the 
treatment of agency costs he and Meckling had provided that “(w)hile the issues are general, 
                                                          
25  Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of 
“Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, 
Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm:  A Reflection on Reification, 
Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1246, 
1246 (2012). 
26  Ron Harris, The History of Team Production Theory, 38 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 537, 
556 (2015).   
27  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 313-23. 
28  Heaton, supra note 14, 211; Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate 
Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567, 568, 583 (1988) (Jensen and Meckling’s “real interest is in the 
diffusely owned modern corporation”); Michael S. Lubatkin, A Theory of the Firm Only a 
Microeconomist Could Love, 14 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 213, 214 (2005) (saying Jensen and 
Meckling’s modelling “was intended to apply only to settings for large for-profit 
organizations operating in developed capital markets with widely diversified shareholdings.”)  
29  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 309. 
30  Id., 327.   
7 
 
we developed the theory in the context of the conflicts of interest between corporate 
managers and outside equity and debt holders.”31   
Given that the public company featured prominently in Jensen and Meckling’s 
“Theory of the Firm” and given the long intellectual shadow their article has cast not 
surprisingly the article has been drawn upon extensively in subsequent analyses of the 
publicly traded firm.  Indeed, Jensen and Meckling’s “theory of agency costs in the public 
corporation” has been characterized as “the dominant framework of analysis for corporate 
law and corporate governance.”32  As we will see next, though, what Jensen and Meckling 
supposedly said about the public company has come to diverge substantially from what they 
actually said.   
III. JENSEN AND MECKLING’S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PUBLIC COMPANY – 
SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION  
Among those who reference Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of Firm” a common 
presumption is that they were public company pessimists.  With agency costs to draw upon, 
they reputedly characterized public companies as business enterprises hamstrung by a 
substantial divergence of interest between managers and shareholders that required corrective 
action and perhaps even full removal from public markets.  In fact, Jensen and Meckling 
were public company admirers who were impressed by the success public companies had 
historically enjoyed and who engaged only in tentative speculation regarding strategies 
available to mitigate agency costs.  This section elaborates on the differences between what 
                                                          
31  Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, FIN. MGMT., Spring 2005, 5, 
6.   
32  Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1325, 1326 (2013).     
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Jensen and Meckling supposedly and actually said, with the focus being on the prevalence of 
agency costs in public companies and corporate purpose.      
A. The “Out of Sync” Public Company 
When “Theory of the Firm” was published in 1976 economists were not troubling 
themselves much with firms.  Firms were “black boxes” thought to be undeserving of close 
attention because of confidence that competitive forces would dispatch to oblivion any 
business enterprise that failed to prioritize profit-seeking.33  Jensen and Meckling specifically 
acknowledged that the economics profession thought about firms in this manner.34  They also 
characterized the publicly traded firm in a manner that clashed directly with economics 
orthodoxy.  Jensen and Meckling said that with agency costs being “an unavoidable result of 
the agency relationship” whenever a company had hired managers rather than owner-
managers it would not be “run in a manner so as to maximize its value.”35  These were “the 
costs of the separation of ownership and control.”36 
It has been widely assumed that when Jensen and Meckling drew attention to the 
downsides with the separation of ownership and control they were offering a damning 
indictment of public companies that implied governance adjustments were imperative.  
Management professor Gerald Davis says Jensen and Meckling combined their “ideas into a 
comprehensive critique of the Berle and Means view of the corporation” that implied it 
                                                          
33  William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts Corporation:  A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415 (1989); Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana, The Social 
Trajectory of a Finance Professor and the Common Sense of Capital, 49 HISTORY POL. 
ECON. 347, 351-52 (2017). 
34  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 306-7.   
35  Id., 327. 
36  Id., 328. 
9 
 
“didn’t make sense” for investors to “put their savings into shares of companies.”37  
According to sociologists Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung, Jensen and Meckling maintained 
the interests of executives and shareholders were “out of sync,” resulting in executives 
“building large diversified firms to minimize the risk of failure and to raise their own 
salaries.”38  Law professor Lynn Stout observed similarly 
“Jensen and Meckling saw the passivity of dispersed shareholders in public 
corporations as a serious weakness that invited professional managers to neglect 
shareholders' interests in the pursuit of their own, leading managers to shirk or even 
steal from the firm.  The result was the dread ‘agency costs’ whose lurking presence 
in public corporations has haunted many finance economists and corporate 
governance experts ever since.”39 
Given the mid-1970s economic context it is plausible Jensen and Meckling were 
public company critics.  In contrast with economic prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s which 
cast corporate America in a favorable light, throughout much of the 1970s stock prices 
swooned amidst growing foreign competition and a dispiriting combination of inflation and 
unemployment (“stagflation”).40  According to Stout, the gloomy economic context meant it 
was acceptable to question “the efficacy of managerial capitalism” and financial economists 
like Jensen and Meckling were “ready to criticize.”41  Dobbin and Jung have similarly 
observed “(t)he stagflation of the 1970s stimulated business to search for a diagnosis and 
                                                          
37  Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1121, 1127 (2011).   
38  Jiwook Jung & Frank Dobbin, Finance and Institutional Investors in THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF FINANCE 52, 56 (Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., 2012).   
39  Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return 
of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2013).   
40  BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 64, 104-5, 109-11 (2018). 
41  Stout, supra note 39, 1173.    
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remedy.  Agency theorists offered both.”42  The Economist did likewise in 2002, saying that 
when Jensen and Meckling “first explored how companies might remedy (agency) problems” 
this occurred “against a backdrop of depressed share prices and lacklustre corporate 
performance.”43 
As for how the agency cost problem afflicting public companies might be addressed 
the received wisdom is that Jensen and Meckling prescribed corporate governance changes as 
a cure.  For instance, Jensen and Meckling ostensibly “called for more independent and 
engaged boards to oversee and discipline top managers.”44  In addition, “Theory of the Firm” 
supposedly advocated executive pay reform, proposing “the best way to align the interests of 
managers to those of the shareholders was to tie a substantial amount of the managers’ 
compensation to the share price.”45  This reasoning reputedly prompted “a critical shift” in 
approach in public company boardrooms that evolved into “the prevailing theory of…proper 
                                                          
42  Jung & Dobbin, supra note 38, 56.   
43  How to Pay Bosses, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2002, 86.  See also Romney the 
Revolutionary, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012, 65; NICHOLAS LEMANN, TRANSACTION MAN:   THE 
RISE OF THE DEAL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 115 (2019).    
44  Yves Smith, Why the “Maximizing Shareholder Value” Theory Is Bogus, 
NAKEDCAPITALISM.COM, Oct. 21, 2013 (available at 
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/10/why-the-maximizing-shareholder-value-theory-
of-corporate-governance-is-bogus.html).  See also MOORE, supra note 23, 82 (identifying 
Jensen and Meckling as “(t)he original exponents of the monitoring board hypothesis”); Jung 
& Dobbin, supra note 38, 56. 
45  Steven Pearlstein, When Shareholder Capitalism Came to Town, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, March/April 2014, 40, 43-44.  See also Stefan Stern, How to Encourage 
Managers to Act More Like Owners, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2009, 12; Steve Denning, The Origin 
Of “The World's Dumbest Idea”:  Milton Friedman, FORBES.COM, June 26, 2013, available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-origin-of-the-worlds-dumbest-
idea-milton-friedman/ (“the article proposed, that to ensure that the firms would focus solely 
on making money for the shareholders, firms should turn the executives into major 
shareholders, by affording them generous compensation in the form of stock.”)  
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compensation in our society today,” namely that executives “must receive a substantial 
portion of their pay in the form of stock-based-compensation.”46   
Jensen and Meckling have been identified additionally as forceful proponents of an 
active market for corporate control.47  They reputedly conceived of the threat of displacement 
by a takeover as a potent and beneficial source of managerial discipline.48  Jensen and 
Meckling’s article has also been cited as the inspiration for the “big idea” that companies 
taken off the stock market by way of a private equity led leveraged buyout (LBO) often 
would “do a better job of getting managers to maximise value than the public equity 
markets.”49  Michael Jensen himself accorded “Theory of the Firm” pioneering leveraged 
buyout status in a 2009 interview: 
“I had occasion to look back at the Jensen-Meckling agency paper and realized we 
had invented leveraged buyouts in that paper.  We didn’t call them that and we just 
talked about them instead of doing them (much to my regret).  A number of years 
later they actually came about, which pleased me!”50 
B. Jensen and Meckling as Shareholder Value Advocates 
In addition to setting out an agenda for fixing (or replacing) the public company 
Jensen and Meckling ostensibly sought to redirect managerial priorities in a shareholder-
                                                          
46  ROGER MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME:   BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM 
CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 11, 13-14 (2011).  See also Cassidy, supra note 5, 66-67. 
47  KHURANA, supra note 8, 301; GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS:  HOW 
FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 56, n. 35 (2009); J.W. Mason, Disgorge the Cash:  The 
Disconnect Between Corporate Borrowing and Investment, Roosevelt Institute 13 (2015).     
48  CHEFFINS, supra note 40, 5, 78.  
49  A New Idolatry, supra note 6.   
50  Pioneers in Finance:  An Interview with Michael C. Jensen, Jesse Isidor Straus 
Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, Harvard Business School, 2010 J. APP. FIN., 
issue #2, 7, 10.   
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friendly direction.  “(A) heightened awareness of the need to serve shareholders better” was a 
pivotal corporate governance trend as the 20th century drew to a close.51  Prioritizing the 
creation of shareholder value ultimately became a hallmark of investor/public company 
relations in the United States.52  Jensen and Meckling are widely regarded as influential 
pioneering advocates of what would become known as “shareholder primacy.”53 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article has been described as an enthusiastically pro-
shareholder piece.  Management theorist Roger Martin maintains that Jensen and Meckling 
argued when presenting agency theory that “the singular goal of a company should be to 
maximize the return to shareholders.”54  Malcolm Salter, a Harvard Business School 
professor emeritus, contends Jensen and Meckling “made an economically elegant case for 
shareholder value maximization as the only legitimate expression of corporate purpose.”55  
Alexander Styhre, another management theorist, says Jensen and Meckling’s “real goal” was 
“to provide the capital owners…with a legal argument that would grant shareholders (and 
nobody else) the right to the variable economic value generated by the firm.”56   
                                                          
51  Winthrop Knowlton & Ira Millstein, Can the Board of Directors Help the American 
Corporation Earn the Immortality it Holds So Dear?, THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION:  AN 
INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 169, 169 (John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson, eds., 1988).  
52  CHEFFINS, supra note 40, 125, 187-88, 240-42. 
53  The term “shareholder primacy” first became part of the corporate governance lexicon 
as the 1980s drew to a close.  See Brian R. Cheffins, Stop Blaming Milton Friedman!, 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 9/2020, 40, n. 188 (2020), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3552950 . 
54  MARTIN, supra note 46, 12-13.    
55  Malcom S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose:  How the Evolution of 
Corporate Purpose Has Contributed to a Widening Breach Between Capitalism and 
Justice . . . and What to Do about It, Harvard Business School Working Paper 19-104 18 
(2019).   
56  ALEXANDER STYHRE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE FIRM AND INVESTOR 
CAPITALISM:  LEGAL-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS 114 (2016).  See also Rick Perlstein, 
Prophets of Instability, NATION, March 17, 2020, available at 
https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/nicholas-lemann-transaction-man-review/. 
(“Theory of the Firm” was “Jensen’s most influential statement” of the idea that managers’ 
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The shareholder advocacy in which Jensen and Meckling ostensibly engaged has in 
turn been hailed as a corporate priority game-changer.  The Economist has suggested their 
1976 article “inspired a seemingly irresistible movement to get managers to focus on value 
for shareholders.”57  Anthropologist Karen Ho concurs, indicating that “Theory of the Firm” 
helped to make “shareholder value seem natural and self-evident.”58  Economist Olivier 
Weinstein likewise maintains shareholder primacy was “partly founded on a specific 
theorization of the enterprise…agency theory, first presented in the seminal article of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976).  It would be hard to overestimate the huge practical and theoretical 
influence of this theory.”59  Jensen and Meckling thus supposedly were “intellectual 
godfathers of the shareholder-centric corporation of the 1980s and 1990s.”60   
C. Jensen and Meckling’s Modest Public Company Agenda 
While the received wisdom is that Jensen and Meckling were pressing for a full-scale 
rewiring of the public company in “Theory of the Firm,” their agenda in fact was 
considerably more modest.  They were seeking to explain firms rather than lobby for 
dramatic change.  Consider boards of directors.  There was no call in “Theory of the Firm” 
for monitoring of executives by independent directors serving on engaged boards.  Instead, 
                                                          
“very existence depended only on maximizing profits for stockholders”); P. M. Vasudev, 
Law, Economics, and Beyond: A Case for Reauthorizing the Business Corporation, 55 
MCGILL L. J. 911, 918-19 (2010) (maintaining a “‘stock market model of corporate 
governance’, is a feature of Jensen and Meckling’s theory.”) 
57  A New Idolatry, supra note 6. 
58  Karen Ho, In the Name of Shareholder Value: Origin Myths of Corporations and 
Their Ongoing Implications, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 609, 622 (2020). 
59  Oliver Weinstein, Understanding the Roots of Shareholder Primacy:  The Meaning of 
Agency Theory, and the Conditions of its Contagion in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
CORPORATION 139, 139 (Thomas Clarke, Justin O’Brien & Charles R.T. O’Kelley, eds. 
2019). 
60  Andrew Smith, Kevin Tennent & Jason D. Russell, The Rejection of Industrial 
Democracy by Berle and Means and the Emergence of the Ideology of Managerialism, ECON. 
& INDUST. DEMOCRACY 2 (forthcoming).  
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Jensen and Meckling simply lumped executives and directors together as managers.61  They 
did not use the term “executives” anywhere in their article, they referred to boards only once 
and they mentioned “directors” only twice, including once in a quote from Adam Smith’s 
1776 classic The Wealth of Nations.62  
With respect to executive pay, Jensen and Meckling acknowledged that “the 
establishment of incentive compensation systems which serve to more closely identify the 
manager’s interests with those of the outside equity holders” was one of a number of methods 
available for discouraging managers from seeking to capture “non-pecuniary benefits.”63  
They also noted that establishing “incentive compensation systems for the manager” that “in 
effect give him a claim on the upper tail of the outcome distribution” was a method that could 
be used to address concerns “large publicly held corporations seem to behave in a risk averse 
way to the detriment of the equity holders.”64  These, however, were little more than tentative 
conjectures.  Jensen, in a 1990 Harvard Business Review article co-authored with Kevin 
Murphy, chastised public companies for paying executives like bureaucrats and lobbied 
forcefully in favor of compensation that aligned pay with performance.65  Such criticism and 
advocacy was absent in “Theory of the Firm”.  
There was similar reticence with the market for corporate control.  Jensen was a 
leading advocate of takeovers during the 1980s, praising the pressure they brought to bear on 
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companies afflicted with high managerial agency costs.66  Such cheerleading did not feature 
in “Theory of the Firm”.  Jensen and Meckling noted that in public companies there were 
occasional “conflicts for control” (they did not use the term “takeover” in their article) but 
said “(f)urther analysis of these issues is left to the future.” 67 
The situation was similar with public-to-private buyouts of publicly traded 
corporations.  Jensen and Meckling acknowledged that if owners of manager-operated firms 
(i.e. shareholders of public companies) sold out to “a single individual with appropriate 
managerial talents and with sufficiently large personal wealth” agency costs could 
disappear.68  Law professor Nicholas Wolfson wrote in 1980 that the prospect of substantially 
reducing agency costs could provide “a powerful economic justification for going private.”69  
Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling themselves were treating a public-to-private transaction 
as a theoretical possibility, not a realistic business strategy.  This is not surprising given that it 
was only in 1978 that leveraged buyout pioneers Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR) 
launched the first private equity fund with a specific mandate to execute public-to-private 
buyouts.70 
D. Side-Stepping Corporate Purpose 
In addition to refraining from lobbying for governance changes for public companies 
Jensen and Meckling steered clear of urging executives to prioritize shareholders.  Again, 
                                                          
66  Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers:   Folklore and Science, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov./Dec. 
1984, 109; Michael C. Jensen, How to Detect a Prime Takeover Target, N.Y. TIMES, March 
6, 1986, F3.  
67  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 352.   
68  Id., 329, 333.   
69  Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 979 
(1980). 




they argued that a corporation was a mere nexus of contracting relationships, and thus of 
minimal independent analytical significance.71  That meant, according to Jensen and 
Meckling, that it was “seriously misleading” to personalize corporations “by asking questions 
such as ‘what should be the objective function of the firm.’”72  After all, a company, as a 
mere contractual artefact, logically could not have a motivating purpose.73   
Having sidestepped the corporate purpose issue Jensen and Meckling could hardly 
turn around and lobby companies to maximize shareholder value.  Similarly, Jensen and 
Meckling’s characterization of the company as a nexus of contracting relationships did not 
provide an obvious foundation for assertions regarding corporate priorities.  With 
shareholders in a company being merely one constituency amongst the contractual nexus a 
firm represents there is no intrinsic contractarian justification for shareholder primacy.74   
While Jensen and Meckling side-stepped the corporate purpose issue, it is certainly 
possible to argue in favor of the pre-eminent governance position of shareholders from a 
contractarian perspective.  Within the corporate contractual nexus shareholders can be 
thought of as the “residual” claimants in the sense the return on their investment is what 
remains after fixed claims a company is obliged to meet have been satisfied.75  Shareholders, 
due to the open-ended nature of an investment in shares, arguably need governance rights in a 
way that other constituencies affiliated with corporations do not.76  Also, with shareholder 
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returns being determined by the net cash flow companies generate over time after all fixed 
claims have been accounted for, the governance pre-eminence of shareholders can be 
defended on the basis a “rising tide of corporate profits will raise all ships.”77  Though some 
have suggested otherwise,78 “Theory of the Firm” did not offer any such residual claimant-
based justifications for shareholder primacy.  Such reasoning would be advanced 
subsequently as the literature on agency costs developed, a process to which Jensen would 
contribute substantially in two 1983 articles co-written with Eugene Fama.79   
E. Jensen and Meckling’s Admiration of the Public Company 
Why were Jensen and Meckling reticent about condemning the public company as 
“out of sync” and proposing changes?  One reason, canvassed in the next section of the paper, 
is that “Theory of the Firm” was a paper written by academics embarking on an intellectual 
journey rather than being the product of fully developed theorizing regarding the firm.  
Another explanation, canvassed here, is that Jensen and Meckling evinced considerable 
admiration for the public company.  They concluded “Theory of the Firm” by saying “(t)he 
publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention.”80  Given Jensen and 
Meckling’s favorable assessment of the public company, neither harsh criticism nor robust 
prescriptions for improvement were likely to follow.    
For Jensen and Meckling the success corporations had historically enjoyed 
commanded considerable respect.  They acknowledged “there were alternative organizational 
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forms available, and opportunities to invent new ones.”81  Nevertheless, they noted, 
“(m)illions of individuals voluntarily entrust(ed) billions of dollars, francs, pesos, etc., of 
personal wealth” to those running public companies.82  Jensen and Meckling did not lose 
sight of the fact that there would be managerial agency costs in public firms.  Indeed, they 
asked rhetorically “(h)ow does it happen that millions of individuals are willing to turn over a 
significant fraction of their wealth to organizations run by managers who have so little 
interest in their welfare?”83  Their answer:  “the law and the sophistication of contracts 
relevant to the modern corporation are the products of a historical process in which there 
were strong incentives for individuals to minimize agency costs.”84   
While Jensen and Meckling said there were “strong incentives” for the curtailment of 
public company agency costs, their analysis of the mechanisms involved was cursory.  For 
instance, even though shareholder voting is a potentially crucial governance mechanism, 
Jensen and Meckling assumed throughout much of “Theory of the Firm” that all outside 
equity was non-voting.85  Jensen and Meckling did acknowledge that executive pay and 
takeover activity could be relevant.86  Nevertheless, to the extent that Jensen and Meckling 
sought to explain the apparent containment of agency costs in public companies, they focused 
primarily on the stock market.  They assumed that high agency costs would depress share 
prices, which would disadvantage proprietors of firms as well as outside investors.87  Those 
                                                          
81  Id.   
82  Id.   
83  Id., 330. 
84  Id., 357.   
85  Id., 351. 
86  Supra notes 64 and 67 and accompanying text.    
87  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 327, 345.   
19 
 
in charge correspondingly had a market-driven incentive to reduce agency costs.88  Jensen 
and Meckling were invoking in this context what Jensen referred to elsewhere as “the 
conservation of value principle,” which is “the basic force that motivates both principal and 
agent, or partners, to minimize the sum of the costs of writing and enforcing (implicit and 
explicit) contracts through monitoring and bonding.”89 
Robert Clark, a distinguished academic corporate lawyer, said of Jensen and 
Meckling’s market-oriented analysis of public companies that “(t)he strongly suggested 
conclusion is that existing levels of agency costs are optimal.”90  In fact, Jensen and Meckling 
acknowledged that steps taken by a company with outside equity to reduce agency costs 
“cannot reduce these costs to zero” and recognized that the magnitude of agency costs 
“would vary from firm to firm.”91  They emphasized, however, that the fact “agency costs are 
non-zero” did not mean the agency relationship in firms characterized by a separation of 
ownership and control was “non-optimal.”92  To evaluate the public company by a standard 
of zero agency costs would amount, by their logic, to commission of the “Nirvana fallacy” 
because other types of business enterprises had their flaws as well.93  For Jensen and 
Meckling, then, the public company did not seem substantially “out of sync” in the market 
environment in which it was operating.  Instead,  
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“The growth in the use of the corporate form as well as the growth in market value of 
established corporations suggests that at least up to the present, creditors and investors 
have by and large not been disappointed with the results, despite the agency costs 
inherent in the corporate form.”94   
Jensen and Meckling’s market-oriented optimism regarding the public company’s 
place in the business world is not surprising given their 1970s theoretical priors.  As 
colleagues at the University of Rochester’s business school they spent much time considering 
“the difficulties of encouraging and obtaining effective peaceful cooperation among human 
beings.”95  They did so with a deep faith in market outcomes, having studied at the University 
of Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s when it was “the intellectual home of the idea that 
markets, not the state, were the proper and most benign central institutions of postwar 
society.”96  Indeed, for Jensen and Meckling it seemed “reasonable to argue that all markets 
are always in equilibrium, and all forces must always be in balance at all times.”97   
When Jensen and Meckling’s faith in market forces was combined with their 
characterization of the public company as a nexus of contracting relations, an optimistic 
verdict regarding the public company logically followed.  With a firm being a nexus of 
contracts, no obvious demarcation exists between the bargains struck in a market 
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environment and intra-firm arrangements.98  It correspondingly followed that public 
companies, as with conventional markets, were presumptively in a state of value-enhancing 
equilibrium.  Or as law professor Michael Klausner has said of conceptualizing relations 
within firms as contractual, “(i)n the corporate setting, this meant that market forces would 
lead the parties to create governance arrangements and adopt legal rules that would minimize 
agency costs and thereby maximize firm value.”99 
IV. WHY WHAT JENSEN AND MECKLING SUPPOSEDLY SAID DIFFERS MARKEDLY FROM 
WHAT THEY ACTUALLY SAID 
The disconnect between what Jensen and Meckling actually said in “Theory of the 
Firm” and what others have written about the article is by no means unprecedented in the 
academic realm.  Bruno Latour, a specialist in the philosophy of science, wrote in 1987 “a 
paper may be cited by others…in a manner far from its own interests” and even “to support a 
claim which is exactly the opposite of what its author intended.”100  Classic works of 
scholarship are particularly susceptible to mistranslation because they are often cited and 
discussed without being carefully read.101  The manner in which Jensen and Meckling wrote 
“Theory of the Firm” lent itself to that outcome.  An article that reputedly “prepared the 
ground for a great remaking of the corporation’s relations with government”102 surely should 
command close attention.  However, as a “long, detailed, formula-filled paper”103 it was 
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destined to test the resolve of even reasonably assiduous readers not fully conversant with 
rigorous economic analysis.   
Michael Jensen’s subsequent academic endeavours also contributed substantially to 
the disconnect between what “Theory of the Firm” supposedly said and actually said.  Jensen 
and Meckling fell out in the mid-1980s after Jensen, seeking to be “close to the world”, 
moved from Rochester to Harvard Business School, which Meckling deemed “intellectually 
second-rate”.104  Jensen had thus fully embarked on a career “that made him one of the most 
influential economists on planet Earth.”105  Since “the world presented itself to Jensen in 
bright primary colors”106 he expressed his views in a forthright manner.  Moreover, what 
Jensen said about corporate America in the 1980s and the early 1990s attracted much 
attention, reinforced by extensive media coverage.107  Subsequent commentators have 
understandably sought to draw connections between the views Jensen advanced during this 
period and the famous “Theory of the Firm” work with Meckling.  Jensen indeed suggested 
in the early 2010s that with respect to what he was saying then it was possible to draw “a 
straight line from where I started back with Bill Meckling working on efficiency in 
organizations and people.”108 
While the emphasis on continuity with regard to Jensen’s work on the public 
company is explicable, this has been a misstep.  Jensen’s views on the public company in fact 
underwent a 180-degree turn subsequent to the publication of “Theory of the Firm”.  Mindful 
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of the success the public company had enjoyed as an organizational form, he was an admirer 
of the public company in the mid-1970s.109  By the end of the 1980s, however, he was 
emphasizing flaws such as “widespread waste and inefficiency” and an “inability to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances.”110   
Jensen’s public company pivot has been largely ignored.111  As a result, Jensen’s 
subsequent public company pessimism has become erroneously associated with “Theory of 
the Firm.”  This section of the chapter traces the intellectual journey that has obscured what 
“Theory of the Firm” actually said.  We will see initially that Jensen and Meckling knew they 
were “only beginning to scratch the surface” with respect to firms in 1976.112  Next, a 
deregulation-oriented corporate theory legacy tied to Jensen and Meckling’s favorable 
assessment of the public company will be identified.  Finally, we will see why Jensen’s 
public company skepticism took hold as he “warmed to his subject.”113 
A. Scratching the Surface 
Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of the Firm” has been described as a product of 
America’s troubled 1970s economy.  Under this view, the article sought to diagnose what 
ailed America’s “out of sync” public companies and prescribe remedies.114  In fact, “Theory 
of the Firm” was not a critique of corporate America.  Instead, Jensen and Meckling thought 
firms were poorly understood and wrote “Theory of the Firm” to try to improve matters.    
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Rewinding to the 1970s, it would have been surprising if Jensen and Meckling wrote 
“Theory of the Firm” seeking to cure corporate ills.  While America’s economy was 
performing poorly in the mid- and late-1970s, contemporaries generally refrained from 
pointing the finger at corporate America.  The primary culprits were instead thought to be a 
sharp spike in oil prices commencing in 1973 and governmental mismanagement of a 
suddenly ailing economy.115  Moreover, Jensen and Meckling began working on their project 
before the 1970s economic slump began.116   
In 1970, Milton Friedman published a famous essay in the New York Times arguing 
forcefully that executives should refrain from pursuing ostensibly desirable “social” ends 
when running their companies.117  One way he sought to make this point was to argue that a 
senior executive of a corporation was in effect an agent of the corporation’s shareholders, 
employees and customers.  This agent would, according to Friedman, be “imposing taxes” on 
these various parties by spending their money in a manner different than they would have 
spent it, such as by “exercising a distinct ‘social responsibility’.”118  Jensen and Meckling 
were drawn to Friedman’s agent analogy and in 1971 began a project that sought to “translate 
Friedman’s journalistic arguments into the language of economics.”119   
Jensen and Meckling’s task proved to be more challenging than they had envisaged.  
Friedman was focusing on what he believed executives should not be doing,120 namely 
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running their firms in accordance with their own conception of what was socially beneficial.  
Jensen and Meckling were exploring instead incentives managers had to run firms in the 
profit-maximizing manner economic models presumed.121  Consistent with economic 
orthodoxy Jensen and Meckling assumed “maximizing behavior on the part of all 
individuals.”122  They struggled to relate this, however, to the notion that firms were profit-
maximizing entities.  This was because the agenda of self-interested managers could readily 
depart from a firm-based profit objective.  As Jensen said a number of years later “Bill and I 
were working on putting this paper together and the more we looked at it, the more we 
became convinced that we couldn’t say that profit maximization was a positive description of 
what went on in firms.  This was the beginning of breaking open the black box of the 
firm.”123 
Note that Jensen referred to the work that he and Meckling were doing that would 
culminate in “Theory of the Firm” as “the beginning.”  This implies cognizance of an 
intellectual journey generally obscured.  Nicholas Lemann has characterized Jensen’s 
thinking about economists’ traditional assumptions about firms once he and Meckling paid 
close attention to managerial incentives as “Total crap!  Makes no sense!  Zero!  Decades’ 
worth of economic thinking based on a mistake.”124  Jensen no doubt came to believe this 
over time.  “Theory of the Firm” was considerably more cautious, however, with Jensen and 
Meckling refraining from treating the public company as being badly “out of sync”.125   
                                                          
121  FOX, supra note 4, 161-62; LEMANN, supra note 43, 113. 
122  Jensen and Meckling, supra note 1, 307.    
123  Pioneers in Finance (Part I), supra note 50, 8. 
124  LEMANN, supra note 43, 113.   
125  Supra note 94 and accompanying text.   
26 
 
Jensen and Meckling generated the first draft of what would become “Theory of the 
Firm” in 1973.126  Hostile feedback they received likely contributed to the cautious tone in 
the published version.  Jensen said subsequently that Rochester colleagues “ran us out of the 
room on a rail.”127  The reaction was similar at the University of Chicago despite the authors 
and the audience sharing a strong pro-market bias, with people shouting “(h)ow can you say 
competition does not solve all problems?”128  Such antagonistic feedback from intellectual 
allies likely would have made even an academic as strong-willed as Jensen pause.   
There also was in the public company context an inconvenient fact confronting Jensen 
and Meckling.  Agency costs no doubt were “non-zero” in publicly traded companies run by 
executives who owned a tiny percentage of shares.129  Such firms, however, dominated the 
American corporate economy.130  Given Jensen and Meckling’s strong faith in market 
outcomes,131 they could not dismiss this pattern lightly.  The result was a somewhat uneasy 
compromise.  There was praise for the public company,132 supported by the observation that 
“in general” agency costs and monitoring in a firm “will satisfy the conditions of 
efficiency.”133  But there was a pessimistic public company twist too, with Jensen and 
Meckling saying steps taken to address agency costs “will not, however, result in the firm 
being run in a manner so as to maximize its value.”134  This pessimism, combined with 
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Jensen and Meckling’s sidestepping of the topic of corporate purpose,135 meant that while 
“Theory of the Firm” has been closely linked with shareholder primacy136 the article neither 
suggested firms actually maximized shareholder returns nor argued firms should aim to do so.  
B. Deregulation and “Theory of the Firm” 
In an award-winning 1978 article Jensen and Meckling argued “(t)he corporate form 
of organization…is likely to disappear completely.”137  While Jensen and Meckling 
acknowledged in “Theory of the Firm” that agency costs precluded public companies from 
maximizing profits in the manner economic theory presumed, this dire prediction was not 
agency cost-driven.  Instead, they argued the public corporation would fall victim to 
excessive regulation, with only those firms benefitting from government subsidies being 
likely to survive ongoing growth in state interference in the market economy.138  Jensen and 
Meckling reaffirmed their regulation-based fears for the future of the public company in the 
early 1980s.139  By this point in time, however, whatever threat state intervention posed to the 
future of the public company was receding.  A deregulatory trend that had begun to take hold 
in the late 1970s was destined to become a cornerstone of Ronald Reagan’s presidency after 
his election in 1980.140   
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The faith in market forces that featured in “Theory of the Firm” found expression in 
the form of a deregulatory turn that would occur in the corporate law theory realm.  A 
“contractarian” approach to the corporation strongly influenced by Jensen and Meckling’s 
description of the firm as “a nexus for contracting relationships” emerged in the 1980s and 
ultimately moved to the theoretical forefront in American law schools.141  As law professor 
Ed Rock and Michael Wachter noted, citing Jensen and Meckling, “a central contribution of 
the nexus approach was to place the corporation into the grand scheme of equilibrating 
markets.”142  Contractarian corporate lawyers believed, consistent with what Jensen and 
Meckling argued in “Theory of the Firm”, that market forces substantially counteracted 
potential abuse from managerial discretion.143  A contractarian aversion to regulatory 
intervention via corporate law followed in turn.144  As Rock and Wachter said,  
“As a continuing theory, the nexus of contracts serves as a powerful metaphor, 
focusing on the voluntary nature of the firm.  As a positive statement, it describes 
statutes that regulate organizations as primarily enabling rather than mandatory, with 
individual terms serving as defaults which, while designed to meet the needs of most 
drafters, can be overwritten when they do not.” 
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Ironically, as we will see now, at the same time the trust in the market underpinning the 
analysis of public companies in Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of the Firm” was influencing 
theorizing about corporate law, Jensen’s faith in the public company was dissipating quickly.  
C. Jensen Loses Faith in the Public Company 
For Michael Jensen his writing with William Meckling from the mid-1970s through to 
the early 1980s was merely an initial step in work on the public company that would involve 
a marked shift in attitude.  It is hardly a revelation that Jensen could change his mind.  For 
instance, “a long strange intellectual voyage” 145 involving the efficacy of share prices has 
been widely reported.146  Jensen wrote in 1984 that “a security’s market price represents the 
best available estimate of its true value.”147  By 2002 he was condemning a “dysfunctional 
conversation between Wall Street” and public company executives about corporate earnings 
which Jensen said resulted in mispricing, and more precisely “overvalued stock.”148  Not as 
widely appreciated is how Jensen went from being a 1970s fan of the public company to an 
academic arguing by the 1990s “stockholders can’t trust the managers they’ve hired to run 
their corporations, and a radical realignment is in order.”149  Jensen’s intellectual voyage, 
strongly influenced by takeover trends, was largely complete by the time the 1980s ended.  
His change of heart is crucial for present purposes because it does much to explain the 
mischaracterizations of “Theory of the Firm” canvassed in Part II.   
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In 1983 Jensen and Meckling acknowledged it was “embarrassing to admit that, after 
several hundred years, social scientists have not yet developed a thorough understanding of 
the advantages and disadvantages of publicly held profit seeking corporations versus other 
forms of organizations.”150  Nevertheless, they remained fans of the public company, saying 
“the corporation as a social invention has been enormously productive and therefore able to 
survive in the wide open competition among organizational forms.”151  Jensen, for his part, 
was prepared to go further than he and Meckling had been in 1976 to explain the public 
company’s success.  In a 1984 article where he sought to debunk pessimistic takeover 
“folklore” he said that it was “difficult to observe” the “subtle” ways in which corporate 
executives were induced to act in the shareholders’ interests.152  Jensen did acknowledge, 
though, that boards of directors would replace underperforming managers when “internal 
control mechanisms are working well.”153  Moreover, “(w)hen these mechanisms break 
down” shareholders “receive protection from the takeover market, where alternative 
management teams compete for the rights to manage the corporation’s assets.”154 
Takeovers would loom large in Jensen’s 1980s thinking about the efficacy of the 
public company.  He was offering his views on takeover folklore the same year as the 
Washington Post said “(a) barrage of takeovers is blasting its way through the corridors of 
corporate America.”155  The 1980s would ultimately become “the Deal Decade” where 
takeover related activities preoccupied executives, commentators, and the public to an 
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unprecedented extent.156  When the tide ultimately turned against takeovers Jensen’s faith in 
the public company drained away.  
Jensen acknowledged in a 1988 article analyzing empirical evidence on takeovers 
“corporate control transactions and the restructurings that often accompany them are 
frequently wrenching events in the lives of those linked to the involved organizations:  the 
managers, employees, suppliers, customers and residents of surrounding communities.”157  
Nevertheless, Jensen was a takeover enthusiast.  This was partly due to the disciplinary 
properties of the market for corporate control in the public company context.  In his 1988 
article on takeovers he said that when agency costs “are large, the threat or actuality of 
takeovers can reduce them.”158  Jensen also believed that takeovers were beneficial for the 
broader American economy.  In a 1987 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal he maintained “the 
restructuring of corporate America…that is being brought about by the takeover market is 
streamlining many of the largest and most complex corporations that are simply too large, too 
complicated and too unfocused to be efficient.”159 
In his 1987 Wall Street Journal op-ed on takeovers Jensen made a plea – “We must 
not strangle these productive forces.”160  He was aware that takeovers had strong opponents, 
led by “top-level managers of many of the largest and most inefficient 
corporations…threatened with the loss of their jobs by takeovers.”161  A front-line tactic 
public company executives could use to thwart an unwelcome takeover bid was to invoke 
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takeover defenses.  As the 1980s got underway Jensen and Meckling were prepared to give 
managers the benefit of the doubt with regard to resisting unwelcome bids, saying “anti-
takeover provisions often enhance the price target shareholders ultimately are paid in a 
subsequent takeover.”162  By 1988, Jensen was a robust takeover defense skeptic, arguing 
“(a)ctions by managers that eliminate or prevent offers or mergers are most suspect as 
harmful to shareholders.”163    
Legal trends helped to induce Jensen’s change of heart, with Delaware court rulings in 
1985 getting the process underway.  In Moran v. Household International Inc., the first case 
where Delaware courts were called upon to assess the validity of a poison pill,164 Jensen 
testified that the pill Household International Inc. had adopted was likely to have an adverse 
impact on shareholders.165  When the Delaware judiciary upheld use of this defensive tactic 
Jensen said this was “incredible” and “fundamentally change(d) shareholders’ rights.”166  
Likewise, when the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Unocal Corporation v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.167 that the board of a takeover target could make a discriminatory self-tender 
offer so as to thwart a raider’s plans Jensen described the ruling as “ludicrous”, “an incredible 
victory” for the target’s chairman of the board  and “a loss for all the rest of us.”168   
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Jensen’s reaction was similar when states began enacting anti-takeover legislation in 
the late 1980s, with the U.S. Supreme Court giving the green light in 1987 in CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America.169  He attributed a wave of anti-takeover statute enactments that 
would ensue to lobbying by “top level corporate managers and other groups who stand to lose 
from competition in the market for corporate control.”170  He said the trend was “another 
example of special interests using the democratic political system to change the rules of the 
game to benefit themselves at the expense of society as a whole.”171   
Jensen drew general negative inferences about managerial priorities from the backlash 
against takeovers.  While he and Meckling emphasized in the mid-1970s that public company 
executives were successfully delivering value for investors despite agency costs, a decade 
later Jensen was saying the public company was “fraught with conflicting interests.”172  He 
reiterated the point in 1988, arguing “(e)vidence on management actions taken to forestall 
takeovers is inconsistent with the view that management always acts in shareholders’ 
interest.”173   
Jensen’s growing mid-1980s public company pessimism coincided with him 
elaborating on the nature of agency costs.  He accused large public companies of 
accumulating counterproductively large amounts of “free cash flow” (money left over after 
all profitable projects had been funded) that executives were likely to squander by engaging 
in vanity driven empire-building or by building up a financial cushion to protect themselves 
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in the event of tough times.174  Jensen argued in the New York Times in 1986 that 
“(c)ompanies with high agency costs due to high free cash flows and poor future investment 
prospects are highly likely to be takeover candidates.”175  Jensen correspondingly feared that 
to the extent managerial lobbying forestalled takeover activity there would be “a reduction in 
efficiency and a significant weakening of the corporation as an organizational form.”176   
Jensen’s faith in corporate enterprise had not been completely undermined.  In a 1988 
interview with Business Week he said “the corporation is a fabulous invention – the most 
important thing since the invention of the wheel.”177  By this point in time, however, Jensen 
was poised to lobby for a major recalibration of the financial incentives of corporate 
executives.  His position on this issue evolved quickly as he lost faith in the public company.   
In a 1984 piece in the New York Times co-authored with Kevin Murphy Jensen 
chastised critics of executive pay, arguing that the available empirical evidence showed 
“executive salaries are determined by the market, and that changes in compensation are 
strongly related to company performance.”178  By 1988 he was warier of the merits of then 
prevailing managerial compensation arrangements, saying that “(o)ur economic 
understanding of internal incentive structures is far from complete.”179  A paper he was 
working on with Murphy that indicated “actual executive-compensation contracts look very 
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different from those predicted by economic theory” no doubt influenced his views.180  In 
1990 Jensen and Murphy published a widely heralded “call to arms” in the Harvard Business 
Review in which they urged public company boards to incentivize managerial compensation, 
arguing that most senior executives behaved like bureaucrats because pay levels barely varied 
in accordance with corporate performance.181  They singled out for praise the Berkshire 
Hathway conglomerate, saying that the 45 per cent ownership stake its CEO Warren Buffett 
held was “a powerful incentive to avoid wasteful spending.”182 
There was a similar timeline with even more radical public company medicine that 
Jensen ultimately prescribed, the public-to-private buyout.  For Jensen in 1984 such 
transactions still seemed quite exotic in nature.  When debunking takeover folklore he 
provided a brief synopsis of “going private” deals where an incumbent management team 
bought up all of a public company’s shares and in so doing acknowledged that “(o)n 
occasion, when going private is a leveraged buy out, management shares the equity with 
private investors.”183  In fact, by that point outside investors had begun to sign up 
enthusiastically to participate in leveraged buyouts via investment funds akin to KKR’s 
pioneering 1978 private equity fund.184   
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In 1985 the New York Times referred to leveraged buyouts as “the business world’s 
latest craze.”185  Jensen was quoted as saying of the phenomenon “(w)e are developing new 
organizational forms to compete with the publicly held company, and it is an interesting 
experiment to watch.”186  Despite this tentative verdict his skepticism regarding the public 
company was plainly evident as he added “(f)or many areas of the economy, the broadly held 
corporation is a dodo.”187  He was somewhat more cautious in his 1988 article analyzing 
empirical evidence relating to takeovers, saying leveraged buyouts were “creating a new 
organizational form that competes successfully with the open corporate form.”188  Jensen 
largely threw caution to the wind, however, when he published the following year an article 
in the Harvard Business Review provocatively titled “The Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation.”189   
Jensen, to make his case in “Eclipse” that the public company had “outlived its 
usefulness in many sectors of the economy,” cited chronic inefficiency and a lack of 
adaptability.190  He also drew attention to governance advantages leveraged buyouts 
ostensibly offered.  These included highly incentivized managerial compensation in 
companies taken private by LBOs and the beneficial discipline the substantial debt used to 
finance leveraged public-to-private deals imposed on managerial discretion.191  Jensen also 
emphasized that firms such as KKR that organized buyout transactions – he labelled them 
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“LBO associations” -- would monitor management more effectively than the “remarkably 
powerless” institutional shareholders who owned the bulk of the shares in publicly traded 
companies.192  This was because LBO association proprietors took “the bulk of their 
compensation as a share in the (acquired) companies’ increased value.”193  Ultimately, 
business enterprises taken private by LBO funds were well positioned to displace the public 
company because “the new organizations…eliminate much of the loss created by conflicts 
between owners and managers, without eliminating the vital functions of risk diversification 
and liquidity once performed exclusively by public equity markets.”194 
Just as a deregulatory movement undercut Jensen’s late 1970s speculation that 
government interference jeopardized the public company,195 economic trends sideswiped his 
1989 eclipse prediction.  The Deal Decade came to a shuddering halt as the 1980s ended.  
This stopped both public-to-private buyouts and hostile takeovers dead in their tracks.196  The 
1990s, moreover, proved to be a banner decade for the public company.  Share prices surged 
and for the first time ever the aggregate market capitalization of publicly traded stocks 
exceeded U.S. gross domestic product.197   
Even though it soon became clear that Jensen’s declaration of a public company 
eclipse “was, at best, premature”198 he was not prepared to cut the public company any slack.  
Having taken on board “the shutdown of the capital markets as an effective mechanism for 
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motivating change, renewal, and exit” he adopted a deeply pessimistic tone regarding the 
public company in his 1993 presidential address to the American Financial Association.199  
He suggested that with the market for corporate control being moribund “we are left to 
depend on the internal control system to act to preserve organizational assets.”200  Jensen 
canvassed in his presidential address recent travails of various venerable American firms to 
seek to demonstrate “the infrequency with which large corporate organizations restructure or 
redirect themselves solely on the basis of the internal control mechanisms in the absence of 
crises” and concluded on the basis of this evidence that such mechanisms had “failed.”201  A 
1997 Journal of Finance survey of corporate governance summed up pithily Jensen’s verdict 
on America’s corporate governance system -- “deeply flawed.”202  This indeed was an 
emphatic 180-degree turn for an academic who had characterized the American public 
company as an “awesome social invention” less than twenty years earlier.203 
V. CONCLUSION 
Governance arrangements in American public companies changed markedly as the 
20th century drew to a close.204  With boards, independent directors moved center stage as the 
monitoring role of boards was prioritized.  The market for corporate control operated at an 
unprecedented pace in the 1980s before receding dramatically in the 1990s.  Incentivizing 
executive pay became a top priority in public company boardrooms.  Maximizing shareholder 
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value rose to the top of the managerial priority list.  During the same period these trends were 
in operation Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 “Theory of the Firm” article was 
becoming one of the most widely cited papers ever in the governance field, as well as in 
various related disciplines.205  Given the article’s notoriety a seemingly sensible inference to 
draw would be that Jensen and Meckling helped to inspire the governance changes America’s 
public companies underwent as the 20th century drew to a close.  As Part II of this chapter 
indicates, the dots in fact do not connect up in this way.   
While Jensen and Meckling’s “Theory of the Firm” has been cited astonishingly 
often, it did not act as the catalyst for late 20th century corporate governance trends in the 
manner it seemingly could have.  The reason is straightforward.  Jensen and Meckling’s 
pioneering work on agency costs would provide a theoretical framework that was widely 
drawn upon to press the case for governance changes.  “Theory of the Firm” itself, however, 
only dealt in a cursory way with boards, takeovers, managerial compensation and corporate 
purpose and did not advance a case for reform on any of these fronts.  This is hardly 
surprising.  Jensen and Meckling inferred from the success the public company had 
historically enjoyed as an organizational form that there must be “strong incentives for 
individuals to minimize agency costs.”206  Why press a case for change?    
Jensen’s subsequent scholarship helps to explain why “Theory of the Firm” has been 
credited erroneously for fostering influential late 20th century governance trends.  His views 
on the public company took a 180-degree turn from 1976 through to the early 1990s and he 
became a forceful advocate for change.  There has been an unsurprising tendency amongst 
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commentators to emphasize continuity with Jensen’s public company theorizing when in fact 
there was little.  Still, while the disconnect between what “Theory of the Firm” supposedly 
and actually said is explicable, there is no reason for this to continue.  Those seeking to 
explain and critique public company governance trends arising from the mid-1970s onward 
should treat Jensen and Meckling 1976 analysis as a mere supporting player rather than as a 
star of the show.      
